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PROPOSALS FOR LIMITING COLLECTION
PRACTICES: NEW HOPE FOR THE DEBTOR IN
DEFAULT
The last two decades have witnessed a marked increase in
the utilization of credit by the consumer in America.' While
this practice has facilitated the distribution of a wider range of
goods and services, it has generated concomitant problems.
What happens when the consumer is unable to meet his pay-
ment obligations on time? Quite naturally, he is confronted by
the creditor, who is seeking payment. This "request" may take
a variety of forms, and varies in intensity and ingenuity. Com-
mon techniques include recurring telephone calls at all hours
of the day and night, sometimes accompanied by abusive lan-
guage, repeated personal visits to the debtor threatening repos-
session, eviction or even arrest, phone calls and visits to neigh-
bors and employers seeking assistance in locating the debtor
and collecting money allegedly owed. More ingenious collectors
write letters on attorney's stationery, intimating lawsuits
which are never filed, or send papers resembling official court
documents in an effort to frighten the debtor into payment to
avoid costly litigation.
While the law recognizes that the creditor has a legitimate
interest in recovering just debts owed to him,2 at some point
this interest must give way to the debtor's right to be free of
unwarranted harassment.3
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions4 have
weakened the collector's traditional weapons of garnishment
and replevin, and this development has caused an increased
reliance on nonjudicial collection techniques. Further, the
sheer size of our modern economy has placed the consumer at
a disadvantage. Personal dealings based on goodwill between
customer and merchant are no longer the rule. Delinquent ac-
counts are often turned over to collection agencies whose spe-
cialization allows them to utilize greater resources than are
1. Between 1950 and 1971, consumer credit outstanding rose from $21.5 billion
to $137.2 billion, an increase of over five times. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE 5 (1972).
2. Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 158 (1951).
3. See Shenfield, Debt Collection Practices: Remedies for Abuse, 10 B.C. INDUS.
& COM. L. REV. 698 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Shenfield].
4. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969).
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available to individual creditors. Hence, when a buyer in de-
fault attempts to work out a payment compromise, he will
probably be dealing with an institution insensitive to his needs
and unencumbered by the need to maintain customer good-
will.' Furthermore, the ordinary customer can rarely afford to
mobilize the legal process necessary to protect his rights, and
as a result, consumers are vulnerable to deceptive collection
practices.'
Last year $3 billion in debts were turned over to profes-
sional debt collectors, who managed to collect $850 million of
that amount.7 Unfortunately, only thirty-seven states and the
District of Columbia have laws to regulate the collectors, and
enforcement of these laws is somewhat of a hit-and-miss propo-
sition.' There are no uniform standards or uniform penalties for
wrongdoing. Even worse, thirteen states have no laws at all.'
Interstate debt collection is a major area of abuse.o The
widespread use of the WATS telephone line has greatly in-
creased the volume of interstate contacts, and state laws can-
not regulate such interstate collection practices. Consequently,
a debt collector can harass a consumer across state lines with-
out fear of sanctions. 1
Remedies for abusive collection tactics have traditionally
been either the regulatory efforts of specialized administrative
agencies, or tort law. In California, collection agencies must be
licensed by the Bureau of Collection and Investigative Serv-
ices, which has the responsibility to regulate them through the
Collection Agency Act." The Bureau has promulgated regula-
5. For a description of the process of assignment of creditor accounts to a collec-
tion agency, see Grant, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High Risk
Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating Present Costs, 14
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 879 (1967).
6. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 AD. L. REV. 271, 273
(1971).
7. The Debt Collection Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 11969 Before the Sub-
comm. on Consumer Affairs of the House Comm. on Banking, Currency and Housing,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
8. Id. An illustration of the effectiveness of state laws is the fact that fourteen of
the sixteen state laws providing for collection agency boards require that a majority of
the board be composed of debt collectors!
9. These states are Alabama, Delaware, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina and South Dakota.10. H.R. REP. No. 94-1202, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT 1.
11. Id. at 3.
12. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6850-6956 (West 1975).
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tions 3 which attempt to describe which acts by collectors are
permissible and which are not, but the Bureau's jurisdiction
extends only to licensed collection agencies and thus excludes
non-licensees and "in-house" collectors. 4 Alternatively, a law-
suit based on a tort cause of action can be filed, but has been
ineffective to curb collection agency abuse. The problems here
have been the cost to the debtor in securing legal services and
the fact that recovery is not always certain unless special dam-
ages can be proved.
An avenue of more promise is the recent enactment in a
few states of unfair and deceptive trade practices statutes."5
These statutes create a private right of action in the harassed
debtor for violations of certain prohibited practices" by a
collector, without the need to show the particular amount of
damage suffered. Thus, the laws afford the possibility of
greater leverage and control over unfair collection methods
than has heretofore existed. The Bureau of Collection and In-
vestigative Services has proposed amendments to existing reg-
ulations controlling licensed collection agencies. In addition, in
the last session of the California legislature there was intro-
duced into the Assembly a bill'7 which was an attempt to as-
similate the best features of existing legislation with the critical
need for more control in this area. Finally, the federal govern-
ment has begun to recognize collection problems, and a House
banking subcommittee began hearings in April, 1976, on pro-
posed legislation 8 to bring the debt collection industry under
federal regulation.
This comment focuses on what remedies presently exist,
both at the state and federal levels, and on the proposed regula-
13. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 606-636 (1975).
14. "In-house" collectors is a general term employed to refer to finance compa-
nies, banks, thrift institutions, department stores, etc., which do their own debt col-
lecting.
15. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 559.55-.78 (Supp. 1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 167
(Supp. 1975); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 93, §§ 24-28, 49, ch. 93A (1972 & Supp. 1975);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.16.100-.950, 19.86.090 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§
427.101-.105, 425.304 (1974). See Comment, Recent Statutes Regulating Debt Collec-
tion, or Nunc, De Minimus Curat Lex, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1274, 1282 (1973).
16. Examples include, impersonating a law enforcement officer or representative
of a government agency; threatening to use force or violence to collect a debt; threaten-
ing to disclose to another information affecting the debtor's reputation for credit-
worthiness or otherwise when the debt is disputed; attempting to enforce a claim
against the debtor which is not legitimate; posting or publishing a list before the
general public of consumers allegedly owing debts ("deadbeat lists").
17. A.B. 2833, 1975-76 Sess. (1976).
18. H.R. 29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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tion of collection practices. In pointing out the inadequacies of
protections presently available, it is hoped that more meaning-
ful measures will be formulated.
PRESENT SANCTIONS AGAINST UNFAIR COLLECTION PRACTICES
Traditional Tort Remedies
Recovery in tort has traditionally centered around a small
nucleus of established tort theories."° Although courts have
been more liberal in granting recovery in recent years,2" the
remedy is subject to a number of inherent weaknesses. Often
the collector's conduct is not severe enough to constitute a
cause of action. Many debtors wish to avoid the publicity
19. The subject has been exhaustively treated by a number of authors. See
Anderson, Coercive Collection and Exempt Property in Texas; A Debtor's Paradise or
a Living Hell?, 13 Hous. L. REv. 84 (1975); Berger, The Bill Collector and the Law-A
Special Tort, at Least for a While, 17 DE PAUL L. REv. 327 (1968); Greenfield, Coercive
Collection Tactics-An Analysis of the Interests and the Remedies, 1972 WASH. L.Q.
1; Holman, Contacting Debtor's Employer Regarding a Delinquent Account, 19 PERs.
FIN. L.Q. REP. 70 (1965); Hurt, Debt Collection Torts, 67 W. VA. L. REV. 201 (1965);
Shenfeld, Current Trends in the Restriction of Creditors' Collection Activities, 9 Hous.
L. REV. 615 (1972); Shenfield, supra note 3; Note, Mental Distress from Collection
Activities, 17 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (1965); Comment, A New Look at the Collection
Agency in California, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 301 (1960); Comment, Effectively Regulating
Extrajudicial Collection of Debts, 20 ME. L. REV. 261 (1968); 31 N. D. L. REv. 277
(1955); Comment, Recovery for Creditor Harassment, 46 TEx. L. REV. 950 (1968);
Comment, Collection Capers: Liability for Debt Collection Practices, 24 U. CHI. L.
REv. 572 (1957); Note, Torts: Scope of Adequacy of Existing Remedies for Improper
Debt Collection Activity, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 410. See also 18 Am. JUR. PiOOF OF FACTS
59 (1967).
20. Texas was the first state to go so far as to recognize a separate tort for
unreasonable collection efforts. Liability arises where the debtor is unreasonably har-
assed by a collector, and these efforts cause great mental anguish, resulting in physical
injury. Physical injury is still a prerequisite to recovery, but the Texas courts have been
flexible in broadening the scope of just what may be included in this category. Thus,
it has been held that physical injury includes: nervousness and indigestion (Duty v.
General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954)), nausea (United Fin. & Thrift
Corp. v. Bain, 393 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965), writ refused per curiam, 400
S.W.2d 302 (1966)), loss of appetite (Signature Indorsement Co. v. Wilson, 392 S.W.2d
484 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)), fatigue (United Fin. & Thrift Corp. v. Smith, 387 S.W.2d
752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965)), loss of memory (Houston-American Life Ins. Co. v. Tate,
358 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962)). In lieu of physicial injury, recovery has also
been allowed for injury to property, reputation, or other actual damage. Harned v. E-
Z Fin. Co., 151 Tex. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
The Supreme Court of Texas has upheld recovery based on negligent conduct
which results in actual damages, and held that willful conduct is prerequisite only to
recovery of exemplary damages. Moore v. Savage, 359 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.),
writ refused per curiam, 362 S.W.2d 298 (1962). This development represents a signifi-
cant step forward as it focuses on a separate and distinct problem unique to the debtor-
creditor relationship.
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which necessarily arises from such a suit. If the debtor, as is
often the case, is from the lower economic level of society,"' his
use of the legal system is hampered by a lack of knowledge and
resources. Even where an attorney is retained and suit filed, the
plaintiff must prove actual (pecuniary) damages." If he sur-
mounts this hurdle, recovery is allowed, but it is limited to the
facts of the individual plaintiff's case, and does nothing to
deter the collector (outside of financial sanctions) from repeat-
ing the same tactics on another debtor. 3
The traditional tort theories have been the subject of fre-
quent comment; 4 hence, they will not be examined in depth
here. Tort claims upon which recovery against collectors has
been founded include: invasion of privacy,2 5 defamation," in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process,6
and interference with the employment relationship. 9
An additional theory was enunciated by a California court
21. In a survey of the most frequent users of installment credit, the profile that
emerged was that of a young, married consumer with children at home and a family
income between $7,500 and $15,000. CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FINANCE 12 (1972).
22. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 112 at 760 n.98 (4th ed. 1971).
23. Shenfield, supra note 3, at 701.
24. See authorities cited in note 19 supra.
25. Cases permitting recovery span a wide range of collection activities. See, e.g.,
Norris v. Moshkin Stores, Inc., 272 Ala. 174, 132 So. 2d 321 (1961) (abusive language
in phone calls to various members of debtor's family); Carey v. Statewide Fin. Co., 3
Conn. Cir. 716, 223 A.2d 405 (1966) (repeated personal visits during illness of debtor's
wife); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956), aff g 99 Ohio App. 485,
135 N.E.2d 440 (1955) (recurring phone calls). The classic case is Brents v. Morgan,
221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927), where the defendant put up a notice in the window
of his garage announcing to all that plaintiff owed money and would not pay.
26. See Sheppard v. Dun & Bradstreet, 71 F. Supp. 942 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Turner
v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.W. 584 (1918).
27. Golden v. Dungan, 20 Cal. App. 3d 295, 310, 97 Cal. Rptr. 577, 587 (1971)
(defendant maliciously caused process to be served late at night, in a loud and boister-
ous manner); Bowden v. Spiegel, Inc., 96 Cal. App. 2d 793, 796, 216 P.2d 571, 572
(1950) (calls to neighbor's phone); Barnett v. Collection Serv. Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242
N.W. 25 (1932) (sending threatening letters to debtor).
28. McGann v. Allen, 105 Conn. 177, 134 A. 810 (1926) (while under arrest,
plaintiff was taken to department store and detained for questioning). See also Czap
v. Credit Bureau, 7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417, 420 (1970) (court found abuse
of process by credit bureau which, knowing plaintiff's wages were exempt from execu-
tion, nevertheless garnished them, and threatened to procure other levies, thereby
jeopardizing plaintiff's job, and thus forcing her to pay the debts from her exempt
earnings).
29. Scott v. Prudential Outfitting Co., 92 Misc. Rep. 195, 155 N.Y.S. 497, 499
(1915) (no debt owed and creditor aware of mistake); Warschauser v. Brooklyn Furni-
ture Co., 159 App. Div. 81, 144 N.Y.S. 257, 260 (1913) (deliberately seeking debtor's
discharge).
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of appeal in Laczko v. Jules Meyers, Inc., 30 in which it was held
that a violation of a statutory duty constitutes a tort and makes
traditional tort remedies available to the plaintiff.
A tort in essence is the breach of a nonconsensual duty
owed another. Violation of a statutory duty to another may
therefore be a tort and violation of a statute embodying a
public policy is generally actionable even though no spe-
cific civil remedy is provided in the statute itself. Any
injured member of the public for whose benefit the statute
was enacted may bring the action."
California Business and Professions Code section 6947 out-
lines a series of acts prohibited to collection agencies." It is
possible to argue that a violation of section 6947 is per se tor-
tious, giving rise to a private right to damages.3 Not only is the
concept untested, but it is subject to many of the problems
inherent in more traditional types of tort remedies, including
access to the legal system and proof of damage.
Administrative Sanctions in California
The State of California requires every collection agency to
be duly licensed." The Bureau of Collection and Investigative
Services, under the control of the Department of Consumer
Affairs, is charged with the responsibility to regulate collection
agencies through the Collection Agency Act,3" and has promul-
gated regulations to aid in implementing that Act. While the
practice of licensing would seem to insure some degree of con-
trol advantageous to consumers, 7 the Bureau's effectiveness is
30. 276 Cal. App. 2d 293, 295, 80 Cal. Rptr. 798, 799 (1969).
31. Id.
32. See notes 41-43 infra for text of relevant sections.
33. Other statutes which may give rise to tort liability by analogy include 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1970) (unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are unlaw-
ful); 47 U.S.C. § 223(1)(D) (1970) (prohibits use of repeated telephone calls in inter-
state commerce to harass any person); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6105 (West 1975)
(attorney who lends his name to be used by one not an attorney constitutes cause for
disbarment); id. §§ 6125-6126 (person not a member of the Bar may not practice law).
See C. BROSNAHAN, DEBT COLLECTION TORT PRACTICE 61 (1971).
34. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6870 (West 1975).
35. Id. §§ 6850-6956.
36. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, §§ 618-636 (1975).
37. See generally Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of
Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559, 586 (1968). The initial objective
of licensing is registration of a definable class. This permits the consumer to inquire
about the status of the licensee, while at the same time allowing the state to investigate
and initiate corrective proceedings in case of violations.
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limited by the scope of the term "collection agency".-" The
statute expressly exempts attorneys, banks, title companies,
and credit insurers, among others." Consequently, the Bu-
reau's usefulness to the consumer is limited.
Nevertheless, for those who are covered by the statute, the
legislature has attempted to control outrageous collection prac-
tices by setting out a limited number of acts which are statuto-
rily prohibited to licensed agencies."' These practices range
from publication of so-called "deadbeat" lists4 to false misre-
presentation of official connection with any government
agency,42 and the use of profanity.4" Furthermore, the ethical
practice regulation of the Bureau requires all licensees to deal
"openly, fairly and 'honestly in the conduct of the collection
agency business."" A similar "laundry list" appears in other
Bureau regulations.45
The Bureau is empowered to impose sanctions for viola-
tions by licensees. It is a misdemeanor to misuse one's license.
Article 10 of the Collection Agency Act sets out the procedure
to handle violations of the prohibited practices listed in section
6947."7 Section 6947.1 provides that any intentional violation of
38. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6852 (West 1975) defines "collection agency" as
"all persons engaging directly or indirectly ... in soliciting claims for collection."
39. Id.
40. Id. § 6947.
41. Id. § 6947(b) provides that a creditor shall not: "Publish or post, or cause to
be published or posted, any list of debtors, commonly known as "deadbeat" lists,
except that this subdivision shall not be construed to prohibit the confidential distri-
bution of trade lists containing debtor information."
42. Id. § 6947(e) provides that a creditor shall not
[hiave in his possession or make use of any badge, use a uniform of
any law enforcement agency or any simulation thereof, or make any state-
ments which might be construed as indicating an official connection with
any federal, state, county, or city law enforcement agency, or any other
governmental agency, while engaged in collection agency business.
A parallel provision is CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.7 (West 1975), which provides
that it is unlawful for a creditor or collection agency to send a communication which
simulates legal or judicial process or gives the appearance of being authorized by a
government agency or attorney when it is not.
43. Id. § 6947(k) prohibits: "Use of profanity, obscenity, or vulgarity, while en-
gaged in the collection of claims."
44. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 627 (1975).
45. Id. §§ 618-621.
46. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 119 (West 1975).
47. Id. § 6925 provides that any person aggrieved by any wrongful act of an
agency may file with the chief a written statement alleging the violation(s). If the
complaint warrants administration action, the agency will assign the case to an investi-
gator, who makes a formal recommendation to the agency. Section 6930 provides a
choice of sanctions which may be imposed by the director only after a hearing (and
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subdivisions (a) through (k) of section 6947 shall result in lia-
bility to any aggrieved person for all actual damages sustained.
For a willful violation of subdivision (1),4s all actual damages
but not less than $250 per violation, are recoverable. The sec-
tion also provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevail-
ing party. Criminal sanctions against the unlicensed are pro-
vided in sections 6871 and 6931. 41 In addition, any superior
court in the state has jurisdiction to enjoin any person collect-
ing without a license.'"
Further, California courts have held that, since the pur-
pose of the statute is to protect the public, violations of section
6947 are actionable by the injured party, even absent a showing
of intent or willfulness."'
Recently, the Bureau of Collection and Investigative Serv-
ices proposed amendments to its regulations for licensed collec-
tion agencies.52 These amendments were passed and became
effective January 1, 1977.13 The changes include valuable im-
provements.
The amendments to section 620 require that collection
forms contain information indicating that the collection agency
is licensed and that complaints may be directed to the Bureau
of Collection and Investigative Services.14 Additions to section
622 require agencies to submit proposed collection forms to the
Bureau, which must approve them prior to their use.5 The
prior approval procedure should significantly affect the use of
false and misleading letters and other printed matter.
may be preceded as well by a warning pursuant to CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 615).
The options range from suspension or revocation of the license to dismissal of the
accusation.
48. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6947(1) (West Supp. 1975) provides that a creditor
shall not
[c]ondition in any manner, whether directly or indirectly, the filing, re-
cording, or delivery of an acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment
upon the performance of any act or the payment of any amount by ajudgment debtor in excess of that to which the judgment creditor or
assignee is entitled pursuant to the judgment.
49. Id. § 6871, 6931.
50. Id. § 6872.
51. See, e.g., Czap v. Credit Bureau, 7 Cal. App. 3d 1, 86 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1970).
52. CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, 88 606-636 (1975).
53. However, § 618, 620(b), 6 2 1(c), 622, 627(d) and 627(g) were the subject of a
preliminary restraining order obtained as a result of strong opposition by licensed
collection agencies. They were ultimately upheld by the Sacramento Superior Court.
Order of Judge Mamoru Sakuma, Haggerty v. California, No. 75-1048, April 1, 1977.
54. Id. § 620(a), amending CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 620 (1975).
55. Id. § 622(b), (c), amending CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 622 (1975).
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Additions to section 627, the ethical practices and conduct
section, prohibit a licensee from contacting a debtor at work
unless otherwise instructed by the debtor;" prohibit a licensee
from contact during hours when the debtor is likely to be
asleep; 7 require the licensee to determine the legitimacy of a
disputed debt;5" and forbid any representation, for purposes of
harassment, that legal action will be taken against the debtor. 9
The section also provides standards by which to make the de-
termination that harassment was the purpose of the collector. 0
Although the amendments are a step forward, it is impor-
tant to remember that the remedy afforded is less than com-
plete. The Bureau is hampered in its enforcement efforts by
two major obstacles; its jurisdiction is still limited to licensed
collection agencies to the exclusion of many other debt collec-
tors and its manpower resources are finite.
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Acts
A brighter development is the emergence, on both the
state and federal level, of unfair and deceptive practices acts.
California has enacted Civil Code section 3369, which provides
that any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practice may
be enjoined in any court of competent jurisdiction.6 Perhaps
the most beneficial aspect is the provision that actions may be
brought not only by the Attorney General, a district attorney,
or city attorney, but also upon complaint of "any board, officer,
person, corporation or association."6 Section 3370.113 allows a
penalty, not to exceed $2,500 for each violation of section 3369.
However, this penalty applies only to actions brought by the
Attorney General, district or city attorney, and the money goes
to the state, county or city.
These sections were utilized in a recent California case,
Barquis v. Merchant's Collection Association, where the plain-
tiff alleged that the collection agency knowingly filed actions
in inconvenient forums "for the purpose of impairing its adver-
saries' ability to defend these actions, and with the intent, and
56. Id. § 627(c), amending CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 627 (1975).
57. Id. § 627(d), amending CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 627 (1975).
58. Id. § 627(e), amending CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 627 (1975).
59. Id. § 627(f), amending CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 16, § 627 (1975).
60. Id.
61. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3369 (West 1955).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. § 3370.1 (West 1955).
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effect, of obtaining an increased number of default judg-
ments."6 The California Supreme Court found this conduct to
be an abuse of process, but in addition held that the repeated
violations constituted an "unlawful business practice" enjoina-
ble under section 3369.65
The Federal Trade Commission Act states that "unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are de-
clared unlawful."" The Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
with court approval, 7 has employed this provision as a vehicle
for condemning various collection activities, 8 by issuing cease
and desist orders. Violation of such an order carries a stiff
penalty," and the Act also provides that the FTC may file a
civil action for knowing violations.7 In addition, under the
Rules of Practice, the FTC is empowered to promulgate trade
64. 7 Cal. 3d 94, 98, 496 P.2d 817, 819, 101 Cal. Rptr. 745, 747 (1972).
65. See also People ex rel., Mosk v. National Research Co., 201 Cal. App. 2d 765,
20 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1962) (defendant's sale of skip tracer forms enjoinable as unfair
competition under section 3369 where forms were similar to official forms used by state
departments of motor vehicles and employment).
66. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (1976).
67. See Rothschild v. FTC, 200 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1952) (Commission acted within
its powers in issuing cease and desist order against collection service which by means
of misleading letters and postcards attempted by subterfuge to obtain information
concerning debtors of its subscribers); Silverman v. FTC, 145 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1944)
(cease and desist order proper to restrain sale of post cards designed for use by creditors
in obtaining by subterfuge information concerning debtors); Dorfman v. FTC, 144 F.2d
737 (8th Cir. 1944) (threats to sue for the purpose of extorting money from customers
where no money is due may be forbidden by FTC and an order to cease and desist from
such practice is within its power under the FTC Act).
68. See Mohr v. FTC, 272 F.2d 401 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 920 (1959)
(condemning sale in interstate commerce of skip trace forms containing false and
misleading statements to elicit information regarding delinquent debtors' wherea-
bouts); DeJay Stores, Inc. v. FTC, 200 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1952) (use of form letter
representing that signer had important letter for debtor and requesting address consti-
tuted deceptive practice); International Art Co. v. FTC, 109 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1940)
(unfair practice for seller to falsely represent to purchaser that his account had been
sold to innocent purchaser for value when such agency was a "dummy" set up by seller
for purpose of making collections). An interesting application is Floersheim v. FTC,
411 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1002 (1969). In that case, the defendant
was a seller of forms to creditors to aid in debt collection. Though the seller lived and
sold the forms in Los Angeles, they were mailed from Washington, D.C., contained
repetitious use of "Washington, D.C." and were set in elaborate type style to simulate
legal documents. The FTC deemed them deceptive and exploitative of low income
debtors who tend to believe that anything coming from Washington, D.C., comes from
the government. The FTC ordered Floersheim to print in large type that the United
States government is not interested in the debt, and further ordered that creditor's
identity be displayed prominently on all forms.
69. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(1) (1976) provides for a $10,000 fine for each violation.
70. Id. § 45(m)(1)(A).
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regulation rules which define specific acts or practices as unfair
or deceptive under the Act.7 Pursuant to this provision, the
Commission has published in the Federal Register2 a proposed
trade regulation rule relating to collection of debts." Among
other practices, the following are prohibited: receiving from a
consumer any obligation which fails to provide that the credi-
tor shall not communicate with consumer's employer or any
person not liable for the debt (other than spouse or attorney),
except as permitted by court order; any provision requiring the
payment of attorney's fees or other costs incident to collection
of the obligation and late charges in excess of finance charges.
An alternative provision sanctions a price-fixing arrangement
whereby the consumer agrees to pay attorney's fees, if referred
to an attorney for collection, but the amount is limited.
To date, the trade regulation rule has not been adopted.
The FTC has, however, promulgated guides against debt
collection deception.74 While not fixed rules (therefore, viola-
tion of a guideline does not constitute a violation of the Act),
the guidelines do alert creditors as to what practices the Com-
mission deems deceptive.7"
In addition to the deceptive practices acts already de-
scribed, there exist a number of federal statutes which have
been utilized over the years, in lieu of anything better, to curb
certain collection practices. It is a crime punishable by a $500
fine or six months' imprisonment or both, to use the telephone
in the District of Columbia or interstate or foreign communica-
tion to make "repeated telephone calls, during which conversa-
tion ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number"76
or to cause the telephone of another repeatedly to ring with
intent to harass.77 The statute has limited application due to
the jurisdictional requirement of interstate communication.
Title 18 of the United States Code contains a series of
sections applicable to certain collection tactics. Section 7127s
71. 16 C.F.R. § 1.8 (1976).
72. 40 Fed. Reg. 16347 (1975) (to be codified in 16 C.F.R. § 444).
73. Id.
74. 16 C.F.R. § 237 (1976).
75. See FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 382 U.S. 46, 47-48 (1965) ("Guides
Against Deceptive Pricing" promulgated by FTC were guides, not fixed rules and were
designed to inform businessmen of the factors which would guide FTC decision).
76. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1970).
77. Id.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 712 (1970). The analogous California provision is CAL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 16, § 633 (1976).
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provides that it is a crime for anyone in the course of collecting
a debt to use in any communication, notice or advertisement
the words "national," "federal," "United States" or "U.S.," in
order to convey the false impression that his business is a de-
partment or agency of the United States."9 Sections 891-89610
deal with extortionate credit transactions. Section 891(6) de-
fines extortionate extention of credit."1 When applicable, sec-
tion 894(a)82 authorizes a fine of $10,000 or 20 years' imprison-
ment, or both, for knowingly participating in the use of extor-
tionate means to attempt to collect any extension of credit. The
statute was designed to prevent loan sharking, and its scope
offers only limited aid to the debtor.83
Sections 1341 and 134284 forbid the use of the United
States mails to further any scheme to defraud or obtain money
or property by false pretenses. Section 171885 prohibits display
on any envelope or wrapper to be conveyed by the mails, of
defamatory or libelous language. Again, this regulation has not
had far-reaching effects on collection efforts, but it has been
effective to curb the most flagrant abuses.
Unfortunately, the problem with all the aforementioned
federal remedies is their parochial application and the diffi-
culty of enforcement by the various agencies charged with im-
plementing them.
The Federal Trade Commission's powers are greatly lim-
ited in dealing with collectors since this agency does not
have a law with which to control collectors but must rely
only on a set of guidelines that do not have the force of law.
79. Cf. United States v. Boneparth, 456 F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1972) (statute does not
reach a merchant collecting his own debts).
80. 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1970).
81. Id. § 891(6) reads:
An extortionate extension of credit is any extension of credit with respect
to which it is the understanding of the creditor and the debtor at the time
it is made that delay in making repayment or failure to make repayment
could result in the use of violence or other criminal means to cause harm
to the person, reputation, or property of any person.
82. Id. § 894(a).
83. See United States v. Perez, 426 F.2d 1073, 1075 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 402 U.S. 146
(1970).
84. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1342 (1970).
85. Bronzin v. United States, 309 F.2d 158 (8th Cir. 1962).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1718 (1970).
87. See United States v. Prendergast, 237 F. 410 (D.C. Ore. 1916); In re Barber,
75 F. 980 (E.D. Wis. 1896); United States v. Dodge, 70 F. 235 (E.D. Pa. 1895); United
States v. Brown, 43 F. 135 (C.C.D. Vt. 1890).
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The Federal Communications Commission is restricted
solely to investigations involving collector's use of the tele-
phone."
The FTC cannot directly help a private individual who
claims to have been defrauded; rather, the agency acts to pre-
vent consumers from being harmed in the future by fraudulent
practices.89 Nevertheless, the Commission does not really have
an impact on the industry-wide practices.' 0 The Commission
may sue one company, but the suit has no effect on what other
companies will do. The FTC simply does not have the resources
or manpower to effectively regulate the collection industry,
which has grown to gigantic proportions.
Because of the inadequacy of existing state and federal
remedies, there have been attempts to effectuate workable,
practical and effective legislation dealing with debt collection
abuses. This concern has led to introduction in both the House
of Representatives" and the California State Assembly' of bills
designed to correct the deficiencies presently existing. The As-
sembly Bill met with stiff opposition from the banks and collec-
tion agencies, and died in committee when the legislature ad-
journed on August 31, 1976. But a brief examination of both
bills will highlight the strengths, weaknesses and possible im-
provements in each, in the hope that meaningful legislation
will eventually be enacted.
A PROSPECTIVE FEDERAL SOLUTION: H.R. 29
On February 19, 1976, Mr. Frank Annunzio, chairman of
the Consumer Affairs Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Banking, Currency and Housing, introduced a bill (origi-
nally H.R. 11969) designed to attack the abuses in the collec-
tion industry. 3 He was careful to note that the bill had been
drafted in conjunction with trade organizations as well as con-
88. Hearings, supra note 7, at 23 (statement of Frank Annunzio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs).
89. See generally 1 Pov. L. REP. (CCH) 3400 (1972).
90. Hearings, supra note 7, at 298 (statement of Lewis H. Goldfarb, Deputy
Assistant Director, Division of Special Statutes, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
FTC). Mr. Goldfarb cited one example where the FTC obtained a consent decree
against a large debt collector who complied with the order, but came back six months
later, on the verge of going out of business, to state that they were complying with FTC
law, but that twelve of their competitors were engaged profitably in the same practices.
91. H.R. 29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
92. A.B. 2833, 1975-76 Sess. (introduced Jan. 22, 1976).
93. 122 CONG. REC. 1192-93 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1976).
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sumer groups "to insure that the Debt Collection Practices Act
is understood as one which seeks neither to wipe out the debt
collection business nor to protect deadbeats from having to pay
legitimate debts.""
Hearings on the bill were held in Washington, D.C., on
March 30 and 31, April 6, 7 and 8, 1976. After consideration of
the testimony received, the Subcommittee adopted a number
of amendments and ordered a clean bill introduced. On May
12, 1976, Mr. Annunzio introduced H.R. 1372011 into the House
of Representatives, where it was passed and referred to the
Senate for their confirmation. No action was taken by the Sen-
ate before the 94th Congress ended. Consequently, the bill was
reintroduced in the House of Representatives on January 4,
1977,8 as H.R. 29, again by Mr. Annunzio, where it was pend-
ing further action at the time of this writing.
The Scope of Protection
Section 802(f) defines "debt collector" as "any person who
engages in any business the principal purpose of which is the
collection of any debt, or any person who directly or indirectly
collects or attempts to collect a debt owed or due or asserted
to be owed or due another. . . ."" The House Report indicates
that this definition was designed to exclude from coverage a
business that extends credit and only collects debts incidental
to the extension of such credit (thus, excluding banks, retailers,
credit unions, finance companies, and attorneys collecting
debts on behalf of clients)." It is also intended to exclude any
wholly owned subsidiary that collects debts for which the par-
ent company is the creditor." At the hearings on the bill, con-
siderable testimony was given as to whether "in-house" collec-
tors should be subject to the measure. Opponents argued it was
unfair not to regulate all who collect debts, and that ninety
percent of the debt collectors would be exempt.' However,
about seventy percent of consumer complaints came from ten
94. Id.
95. Id. at 4347 (daily ed. May 12, 1976).
96. 123 CONG. Rc. H79 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1977).
97. H.R. 29, § 802(f), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (emphasis added).
98. REPORT, supra note 10, at 3.
99. Id. at 3-4.
100. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 7, at 179 (testimony of Jack Fletcher, mem-
ber of American Collectors Association's National Legislative Council and President,
United Creditors Service, Inc., Nashville, Tenn.).
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percent of the debt collectors-those employed by collection
agencies,'"' and the Subcommittee decided to focus the legisla-
tion on only that segment of the collection industry.
Notice
Section 808 contains an important protection for the con-
sumer. It provides that the collector must, within five days of
initial contact, send the consumer a written notice stating the
amount of the debt, name and address of the original creditor,
the creditor currently owed, and a statement that unless the
consumer disputes the validity of the debt within thirty days,
the collector will assume its validity. If the consumer does dis-
pute its validity within that time, the collector must cease all
collection efforts until certification of the bill's validity is re-
ceived from the creditor and a copy mailed to the consumer.
This procedure will serve to eliminate a major source of com-
plaints-attempted collection of a mistaken debt.' 2
Communications in Connection with Collection Activities
Section 803 provides that no collector may communicate
other than by telephone, mail or telegram with any person for
purposes of acquiring location information about any con-
sumer-i.e., "skip tracing." This provision was inserted to end
the harassment of relatives, employers, school teachers, or any-
one who might have an idea where a debtor had moved, as well
as to protect the privacy of the debtor. The section requires
that the collector identify himself and his employer; that he not
communicate with each person more than once (except to re-
confirm location information previously supplied); and that he
refrain from stating that the consumer owes a debt.
The proposed Act sets forth the circumstances in section
804 under which a collector may communicate with a con-
sumer, spouse or third party for the purpose of collecting the
debt. To eliminate round-the-clock harassment, contacts are
limited to the hours between 8 a.m. and 10 p.m. While oppo-
nents argue that this limitation hampers their ability to reach
persons who work at odd hours,' 3 the fourteen-hour time span
101. Id. at 247 (testimony of Thomas Raleigh, Manager, Illinois Collection
Agency, Office of Consumer Services).
102. See id. at 29-30, 181, 204.
103. See generally id. at 314-15.
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was deemed sufficient for debt collection purposes. The collec-
tor may contact individuals personally for the purpose of col-
lecting a debt but not for the purpose of acquiring location
information. It is unclear precisely how that distinction will be
made in practice.
The collector is also prohibited from contacting a con-
sumer once it is established that the latter is represented by an
attorney, unless the attorney is unjustifiably nonresponsive to
communication from the collector (quere: what conduct will be
deemed sufficient to satisfy this?). A much debated provision'0 4
is section 804(a)(3) which states that after the initial contact
with the debtor, no more than two communications per week
are allowed. Section 804(b) limits the collector to one commu-
nication with the debtor at his place of employment. This rep-
resents an effort to eliminate the propensity of employers to fire
workers who fall deeply in debt and whose creditors repeatedly
interrupt the work day of the individual. Similarly, section
804(c) forbids communication with third parties, except, as to
employers, after a court order establishes the consumer's liabil-
ity. The section attempts to reduce the collectors' reliance on
the employer to aid them in getting the debtor-employee to
pay, especially without first establishing that the debt is valid.
Prohibited Practices
After receiving testimony of the use of physical threats and
trickery by debt collectors,0 5 the Subcommittee passed section
805. It forbids harassment, intimidation or threats to collect a
bill. Several modes of conduct are expressly forbidden, includ-
ing violence to persons or property, abusive language, so-called
"deadbeat" lists, harassing telephone calls or visits to home or
office. The latter was inserted to end the use of a peculiar
technique known in the trade as "beating"-the continuous
calling of an individual, at five minute intervals, until he is
"beaten" down and agrees to pay. 06
Section 806 parallels some of the federal statutes con-
104. Id. at 58-59 (testimony of William Gaines, reporter for the Chicago
Tribune).
105. Id. at 29-45 (testimony of James Clark). Mr. Clark testified that one woman
was told that she would be sent a pair of "cement shoes" if the debt were not paid.
Another time Mr. Clark phoned a woman and, impersonating a policeman, informed
her that her son had lost both legs in an auto accident. When she arrived at the hospital
and found the report to be a hoax, she was so relieved "she thanked us that her son
was still alive and paid the debt." Id. at 34.
106. Id. at 31.
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tained in Title 18 of the United States Code,' °7 but is more
comprehensive in scope. It generally prohibits any debt collec-
tor from making any false or misleading representation to any
person, and then enumerates sixteen examples of what consti-
tutes a "false or misleading representation."'0 8 These are gener-
ally the worst of the abusive collection techniques, and the ones
most frequently employed.
Section 807 forbids the collection of any amount unless
expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt, and
also forbids the acceptance of any post-dated check. The latter
was by far the most hotly contested prohibition.' Collectors
have long used this as a ploy to get a debtor to give them a
check, albeit dated for the future. Ostensibly, the debtor is told
that furnishing a post-dated check will eliminate any need for
further harassment. Then the check is deposited prior to the
date on the check, and the debtor becomes liable for a criminal
violation for writing a bogus check. Section 807(2) seeks to
eliminate this practice.
In sum, the prohibited practices sections of the bill at-
tempt to outlaw the most common and offensive tactics em-
ployed by collectors, while still allowing them reasonable ac-
cess to pursue legitimate debts. Its specificity will be an asset
in enforcement, and provides collectors with a uniform stan-
dard by which to gauge their activities. For that reason, it
should aid the debtor and collector alike, and fills a heretofore
existing void.
Penalties
The Act would make any violator liable to the person in-
jured for any actual damages sustained,"10 implying that these
damages must be pleaded and proved. It also provides statu-
tory liability, in individual plaintiffs, of not less than $100 nor
more than $1,000.1" The provision of a private right of action
107. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 712 (1973).
108. H.R. 29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 806 (1977). Included are false representa-
tions as to the character, amount or legal status of any debt; that any individual is an
attorney; that nonpayment of the debt will result in imprisonment, or the seizure,
garnishment or sale of any of the debtor's wages or property; that the collector is
seeking information in connection with a survey, or has a package or gift for the
consumer.
109. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 125-27 (testimony of D. Barry Connelly, Vice
President, Public Affairs/Public Relations, Associated Credit Bureaus).
110. H.R. 29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 812(a)(1) (1977).
111. Id. § 812(a)(2)(A).
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is one of the main strengths of this legislation. The consumer
need not rely on a district attorney or any government agency
to prosecute his complaint. He is no longer confined to narrow
tort theories of recovery, with elements often difficult to estab-
lish. In addition, the bill provides for the recovery, in successful
actions, of reasonable attorney's fees and costs, ' so that the
average consumer will no longer be forced to forego court action
because of a lack of funds. The threat of private enforcement
should also be an effective deterrent to small-time operators,
who heretofore have not feared action by the federal govern-
ment because they knew their activities would very likely never
come to light."'
H.R. 29, by implication, provides for class action suits in
specifying that the court shall determine the amount of recov-
ery," 4 taking into account such relevant factors as the amount
of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and persistence
of the violations, the resources of the debt collector, the num-
ber of persons adversely affected and whether the violation was
intentional."'5
Subsection (c) is an escape valve for the collector. If he can
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the viola-
tion was not intentional and was the result of a bona fide error,
he may avoid liability."6 Subsection (e) provides a further ex-
emption from liability for any act done or omitted in good faith
in conformity with any interpretation of the FTC, even if such
interpretation is later rescinded or held invalid by a court."7
In addition to civil liabilities the proposed Act provides for
criminal penalties of a $5,000 fine, one year in jail, or both, for
wilful and knowing violations."'8 Presumably, enforcement of
this provision will be the province of the FTC pursuant to
section 814.111 Enforcement problems similar to those which
exist for present statutes administered by that agency may
arise. Those enforcement problems combined with the penal
nature of the statute could generate opposition to the passage
112. Id. § 812(a)(3).
113. Hearings, supra note 7, at 297.
114. H.R. 29, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. § 812(a)(2)(B) (1977).
115. Id. § 812(b).
116. Id. § 812(c).
117. Id. § 812(e).
118. Id. § 813.
119. Section 814 specifies that compliance with the Act shall be enforced by the
Commission.
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of the Act. Perhaps a compromise enforcement procedure could
be arranged to facilitate implementation of this section, by
removing the stigma of a penal sanction. The section would be
more palatable to the collection industry if a civil penalty,
similar to that provided for by the Federal Trade Commission
Act, "' were authorized and the imprisonment provision de-
leted.
H.R. 29 would apply to debt collectors in every state, re-
gardless of whether or not the individual state has licensing
requirements and its own regulations of the industry.' This
uniform application will help provide stability throughout the
industry, and enable more uniform enforcement by the FTC.
The one weak spot in its application is the exclusion of "in-
house" collectors, but they have traditionally not been among
the worst offenders, and hence the exclusion is not crucial.
What the proposed Act does is provide some important
protections to the consumers from the unscrupulous tactics of
many collectors. It will make mandatory a procedure to deter-
mine at the outset the validity of any debt in question. It will
prohibit harassment and coercion in attempting to squeeze
money from the debtor. Most important, it provides the con-
sumer with a statutory cause of action against any violator, and
in addition imposes monetary sanctions stiff enough to be
taken seriously by the collection industry. It is an important
piece of legislation that deserves serious consideration by Con-
gress.
CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Assembly Bill 2833 (A.B. 2833), known as the Consumer
Debt Collection Fair Practices Act, was introduced to the Cali-
fornia Assembly on January 22, 1976, by Assemblyman Her-
schel Rosenthal. Existing state law does not include a compre-
hensive act enumerating prohibited conduct in the collection
of consumer debts. Although licensed collection agencies are
subject to the Bureau's regulations, and the Collection Agency
Act, there are no presently existing sanctions on those collec-
tors exempt from these prohibitions who are operating within
120. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(1) (Supp. 1976) mandates a civil penalty of not more than
$10,000 for each violation of a cease and desist order of the FTC.
121. Section 816 states that the Act does not exempt any person from state laws
respecting debt collection practices except to the extent that the two may be inconsist-
ent. In that case, the federal law would be controlling to the extent of the inconsistency.
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the state. A.B. 2833 attempted to fill that gap. The bill was
prepared and sponsored by the Western Center on Law and
Poverty at the request of Assemblyman Rosenthal. The bill was
amended in Assembly on May 6, 1976, and was referred to the
Assembly Judiciary Committee for interim study, where it
eventually died when the legislature adjourned on August 31,
1976. At the present time the bill is under study by the Western
Center. They feel there is a clear need for this type of legisla-
tion, and hope to re-sponsor a compromise bill in the near
future which will meet with less strident opposition from the
financial institutions."' The hope is that in this manner some
sort of meaningful legislation will finally be enacted. A.B. 2833
can be profitably compared with the other solutions outlined
above.
The Scope of the Act
In constrast to H.R. 29, its federal counterpart, A.B. 2833
defines "debt collector" as "any person engaging, directly or
indirectly, in debt collection from a consumer ..... "I Be-
cause many of the activities proscribed by A.B. 2833 were al-
ready prohibited for licensed collection agencies under the
Business and Professions Code,' 4 the bill is primarily designed
to regulate unlicensed debt collectors, including banks, retail-
ers, and credit unions.' 5 It has received considerably more at-
tention because of that. The opposition of "in-house" collectors
has already resulted in several amendments to the text of the
original bill in an effort to win their support (or at least neutral-
ity) and thus hopefully to increase the chances of passage by
the full Assembly' 6 some time in the future.
Communications in Connection with Collection Activities
The proposed Act is not as harsh in its prohibitions on
122. Statement by Brian Paddock, Directing Attorney, Western Center on Law
and Poverty, in telephone interview on February 10, 1977. After this comment went to
press, Assemblyman Herschel Rosenthal introduced A.B. 1078 into the Assembly on
April 1, 1977. It is substantially similar in content to A.B. 2833.
123. A.B. 2833, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. § 1882.1(e) (1976) (emphasis added).
124. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
125. Letter from Brian Paddock to Eric Wright (April 27, 1976) [on file at SANTA
CLARA L. REV.].
126. The most significant amendments were the deletion of a section providing
that violators were guilty of a misdemeanor, and the inclusion of section 1882.7, allow-
ing limited contacts for specified purposes with a debtor's employer. See letter from
Brian Paddock to Nancy Wilson (May 13, 1976) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
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contacts with employers as H.R. 29. The collector is allowed to
contact the employer for purposes of skip tracing "when the
debt collector has no other reasonable means of obtaining such
information, provided such communication does not involve
anything relating to the nature or amount of the alleged
debt.""' Furthermore, the collector may contact the employer
"to establish whether the employee has a debt counseling serv-
ice or procedure, or is willing to assist in working out a program
for paying off the debt."'' 18 A.B. 2833 does not address the valid-
ity or frequency of debtor contact or third party contact and
allows for continued communication with the employer after
this initial contact is established. The California bill ignores
the entire area of limiting collection contact and in this respect
is substantially weaker than H.R. 29.
Prohibited Practices
The debt collector, unless an active member of the State
Bar, is specifically barred from certain practices which are
deemed to constitute the practice of law.'29 Included is the
prevalent practice of falsely using an attorney's name or sta-
tionery in communications with a debtor.'3 ° Additionally, the
bill prohibits threats, harassment, and coercion. Section 1882.6
specifically delineates conduct of a coercive nature that is
deemed a violation of the Act. This includes the threat or use
of violence to harm an individual, his reputation or property;' 3 '
the use of knowingly false accusations that a consumer is will-
fully refusing to pay a just claim;' 32 the threat that nonpayment
of a claim will result in arrest, garnishment or attachment of
any property or wages of the consumer without a judgment;' 3
and the attempted execution upon property which the collector
knows is exempt under state or federal law from execution.'34
It is unclear whether the statutory listing is meant to be exclu-
sive.
The bill includes a section prohibiting a number of com-
127. A.B. 2833, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. § 1882.7(a)(1) (1976).
128. Id. § 1882.7(a)(3).
129. E.g., id. § 1882.5.
130. Id. § 1882.5(d).
131. Id. § 1882.6(a).
132. Id. § 1882.6(c).
133. Id. § 1882.6(e).
134. Id. § 1882.6(k).
19771
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
mon misrepresentations, including the use of pseudonyms,' 35
the false claim that the collector has something of value for the
consumer, 38 and any false claim of connection with the state
or federal government.'37 One subsection in particular adds a
valuable and unique provision. It is designed to curb a preva-
lent abuse-that of falsely leading a consumer to believe that
a court appearance will be necessary on a certain date, unless
the debt is paid.' 3 Debtors can often be coerced into paying
even disputed sums when faced with the possibility of expen-
sive and time-consuming litigation, especially as they are often
ignorant of their legal rights.
The provision makes it a violation of the Act to seek to, or
to obtain a waiver of any debt discharged in bankruptcy, to
acknowledge a debt barred by a statute of limitations or to
waive an exemption from attachment, seizure, levy or execu-
tion.'38 This provision represents a positive step to protect the
legal rights of consumers and should be widely advertised as
such to ensure consumer awareness.
These prohibited practices largely parallel those presented
by the proposed federal Consumer Credit Protection Act. How-
ever, the state law applies to a wider group of debt collectors,
and to that extent, would be controlling. In addition, it sets out
with more specificity actual tactics prohibited, and provides
for some innovative consumer protections apparently over-
looked by the federal statute, especially the prohibition against
threatening the debtor with court appearances should he fail
to pay.' 40
Penalties
Perhaps the greatest strength of the proposed bill is that
it provides the consumer with a remedy other than filing a
complaint with the Bureau of Collection and Investigative
Services, or pursuing a tort lawsuit. 4 ' The Act provides that
any person may seek injunctive relief to restrain a violation, as
135. Id. § 1882.9(a).
136. Id. § 1882.9(c).
137. Id. § 1882.9(f), (g).
138. Id. § 1882.9(1). See letter from Brian Paddock to Nancy Wilson (May 13,
1976) [on file at SANTA CLaR L. Ray.].
139. A.B. 2833, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. § 1882.10(a).
140. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
141. Letter from Brian Paddock to Nancy Wilson (May 13, 1976) [on file at
SANTA CLaRA L. REV.].
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well as providing for treble damages (it also provides a mini-
mum $300 recovery in the event the consumer is unable to show
his actual damages), attorney's fees and costs.4 2 It should be
noted that the debt collector is similarly protected from frivo-
lous suits by the provision assessing defendant's attorney's fees
and costs against the plaintiff upon a finding by the court that
an action was brought simply to harass the collector.
4 3
The Act does not, however, empower the consumer to in-
stitute disciplinary proceedings against a collection agency li-
censed pursuant to the Business and Professions Code. " Also
notably missing from the bill is the escape valve allowed by
H.R. 29's section 812(c). This measure permits the collector a
good faith defense for an unintentional violation resulting from
a bona fide error, if the error can be demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence. Inclusion of such a provision would cer-
tainly be to the collector's advantage, without working a real
hardship on the consumer, and would undoubtedly aid in pas-
sage of the bill.
Both the proposed federal and state legislation are de-
signed to protect against the same type of abuses. The scope
of California's proposed law is broader and will thereby regu-
late a larger segment of the collection industry. California is
also more specific in what activities it will and will not allow a
collector to pursue, although it is noticeably weaker when it
comes to limiting communications with a debtor, his family or
employer. California has neglected to include a procedure
whereby the collector must ascertain the validity of the debt
before proceeding with any attempts to collect it.' Nor has
California seen fit to include a provision whereby the collector
must cease further direct collection efforts (except to advise the
consumer that an attorney may subsequently invoke local cred-
itor's remedies) when the debtor absolutely refuses to pay or
discuss an account.'46 Furthermore, it has not addressed itself
to the problem of post-dated checks, discussed previously. 47
Those debt collectors operating in California who fall within
the jurisdiction of the federal law will be subject to these regu-
lations, but unless the state legislation is amended, certain "in-
142. A.B. 2833, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. § 1883.1 (1976).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 1883.2.
145. H.R. 29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 808 (1977).
146. Id. § 804(d).
147. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
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house" collectors will not be affected at all by these important
considerations.
CONCLUSION
Where will these procedures leave a debtor who has fallen
victim to any or all of the weapons in a collector's arsenal of
tactics? If fortunate enough to possess the financial resources
needed, and resourceful enough to be able to show any special
damages, he might file a tort claim against the collector. How-
ever, his victory will have no effect on the next victim of that
collector. If the collector operates in a state with the foresight
to require licensing, unscrupulous tactics, if brought to the
attention of the regulatory agency, might be deemed a violation
of these statutes and a variety of sanctions applied. Again, the
effectiveness rests with the administrative agency, and not
with the individual who has been harmed. Federal statutes
offer relief in certain limited circumstances, and recent work by
the Federal Trade Commission has been encouraging. But the
Commission has not the resources to put even a small dent in
the problem.
These inadequacies have been recognized by the recently
proposed legislation analyzed here. Both the Debt Collection
Practices Act 8 and the proposed Consumer Debt Collection
Fair Practices Act 4' represent viable attempts to put an end to
the tyranny of the unscrupulous bill collector. While these stat-
utes do not contain all the provisions that the most adamant
advocates would like, they do incorporate some of the more
workable alternatives, and will place no undue hardship on the
collection industry itself. It is hoped that the respective legisla-
tors are sufficiently cognizant of the difficulties presently exist-
ing for the debtor in default to take affirmative action on the
proposed legislation. While minor changes and revisions may
be in order, the proposed acts supply the consumer with the
basic tool he has always lacked, a private right of action for
specifically enumerated violations of ethical practice in the
collection of debts.
Nancy Anne Holst
148. H.R. 29, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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